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Abstract: 
Economic self-interest and politico-strategic and humanitarian concerns motivate 
donor countries in their development assistance policies. A large amount of literature 
has pointed out that either economic self-interest or political self-interest played a 
pivotal role in the early phases of foreign aid programmes of many donors. Currently, 
almost all donors include humanitarian assistance in explaining their aid motives. We 
investigate how Japanese aid allocation policies have changed over the time and also 
identify empirically the major determinants of aid allocation. It is found from the 
empirical evidence that Japan takes national interest as well as recipient country 
needs into account in allocating their aid. The nature of Asian biasness in Japanese 
aid may continue given the high emphasis on national economic and security 
interests. Given the historical trend one can conclude that the same determinant 
factors may keep on playing vital roles in aid allocation decision-making at least for 
some years to come even though there has been an increased call for more 
assistance to poor regions. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Economic self-interest and politico-strategic and humanitarian concerns motivate 
developed countries in their development assistance policies. More specifically these 
include promotion of trade, direct foreign investments, image-building of the donor in 
the international arena, national security, as well as democracy and civil liberties in 
recipient countries. In addition, relationships derived from past colonial ties often 
influence aid flows positively (Alesina and Dollar, 1998: 1; Todaro and Smith, 2003: 
653). An abundant amount of literature has pointed out that either economic self-
interest or political self-interest has played a pivotal role in the early phases of 
foreign aid programmes of many donors. For instance, the United States used her aid 
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programmes as strategic tools to halt the former Soviet Union in its tracks 
throughout the developing world in the 1940s and 1950s (Orr, 1990: 104). Japan 
used aid as an important instrument in the re-establishment of her trade and 
investment in the 1950s and 1960s (Hasegawa, 1975: 3; Ozawa, 1989: 95; Koppel 
and Orr, 1993: 353, Rix, 1993: 18, Tisch and Wallace, 1994: 6, and MOFA, 20022)  . 
However, in an attempt to respond to international criticism and also due to many 
global-level initiatives including the Millennium Development Goals, rich countries 
have pledged to increase assistance to low-income countries and also have changed 
their aid policies to certain extent. Assistance has been reaffirmed in various forums 
such as the Doha ministerial declaration of the WTO meeting in 2001 and the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg in 2002 (UNDP, 2003: 145) 3.  
 
Currently, almost all donors mention humanitarian assistance in explaining their aid 
motives. Japan is formulating a new ODA charter and it has indicated in its draft ODA 
charter that Japan seeks a greater role in promoting economic development in 
developing counters. It is also said that the new draft is significantly different from 
the old charter enacted in 1992. Whatever the policies mentioned in documents, 
however, donors’ motives are sometimes suspected. Japanese aid allocation is not 
free of criticism and it is argued that Japan’s aid policy is simply a continuation of her 
domestic post-war economic recovery strategy; that is, concern for her domestic 
prosperity and security.  
 
Whatever the reasons given above, Japan as one of the largest donor countries in 
the world, making ODA contributions to more than 150 developing countries. She 
provided a peak of $15.3 billion in foreign assistance in 1999 (0.35 per cent of GNP), 
perhaps the highest amount among all the industrial countries (Yamashita and 
Khachi, 2003: 1). This is above the average of 0.29 per cent for all industrial 
countries, though it is well below the internationally agreed United Nations target of 
0.7 per cent. Due to the prolonged economic slump, however, the ODA budget was 
slashed by 9.4 per cent in 2003 following an 11.9 per cent drop in 2002. But it is 
important to look at how Japanese aid policies have changed over time and what 
factors really determine the allocation of Japanese funds given its huge aid package. 
To the authors’ knowledge, there are few studies available on Japanese aid allocation 
using a long sample period with cross country data. We hope this empirical study will 
provide a comprehensive understanding of the aid allocation behaviour of Japan. The 
study will also shed light on some possible future scenarios. The objectives of this 
paper are: (1) to briefly explain how Japanese aid allocation policies changed over 
the time; (2) to identify major determinants of Japanese bilateral aid allocation; and 
(3) to evaluate the stated objectives mentioned in various aid policy documents 
versus their actual achievements. The paper is organized as follows. Following this 
introduction, section 2 presents briefly the Japanese aid allocation policy, its 
evolution and regional distribution. Section 3 furnishes a review of the existing 
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literature on aid allocation, while section 4 presents the specifications of the 
econometric model estimation. The interpretations of the results together with the 
concluding remarks are made available in the final section.  
 
2. Japanese aid allocation, its evolution and regional distribution 
 
This section briefly reviews the evolution of Japan’s aid policy, its relative size and 
regional distribution. 
 
Early stage of Japanese aid: 1950s and 1960s 
 
Japan commenced her development assistance programmes through technical 
assistance in 1954, just after the joining of Colombo Plan4. Japan joined the Colombo 
Plan on 6 October 1954 with a contribution of $50,000, while still receiving economic 
assistance from the World Bank and the US5. It was as a member of this organisation 
that Japan initiated its foreign assistance programme (Ratnayaka, 2003). In 1958, a 
first ODA loan of Yen18 billion was extended to India and grant aid and food aid 
started in 1968. At its inception Japanese aid started from her post-war economic 
recovery strategy by war reparation negotiations or economic cooperation with the 
Asian nations Japan had occupied during World War II. In 1954, the Japan-Burma 
Peace Treaty and Agreement on Reparations and Economic Cooperation was signed. 
In 1955 a reparations department was established by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
in its Asian Affairs Bureau. Reparations agreements were signed between Japan and 
Philippines in 1956 and between Japan and Indonesia in 1958. An agreement was 
also signed with Thailand and later on special aid packages were extended to 
Singapore, Vietnam, and Malaysia. Japanese aid in the 1950s was heavily linked with 
her economic benefits: expansion of the export market, assurance of the inflow of 
raw materials for expanding domestic companies and supporting the participation of 
Japanese companies in many Asian countries. Though the sum of reparation 
expenditure was only about $1 billion over 20 years, it contributed significantly to 
pursue her economic interest (Brooks and Orr, 1985: 324). At the same time the 
arrangements helped Southeast Asian countries to increase their capacity and to 
accelerate their economic development. So, the aid policy of Japan in the 1950s and 
1960s can be seen simply from her economic interest in the post war period and not 
from Japan’s overall foreign policy or the inherent aid philosophy that came to 
prominence in the 1970s.  
 
Japanese aid in the 1970s and 1980s 
 
By 1978, Japan appeared as a major bilateral donor in Asia and by the year 1989, 
Japan emerged as the number one donor in the world with a net disbursement of 
$8.965 billion (Association for Promotion of International Cooperation, 1991:61). 
Since then, with the natural ups or downs of her position among development 
                                                 
4  The Colombo Plan was launched in 1951 and takes its name from Sri Lanka’s capital where the plan 
was formulated and established (Arnold, Guy (1996), Historical Dictionary of Aid and Development 
Organisation, Lanham, Maryland: The Scarecrow Press. P. 35).  
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(from 1952 to 1966) and it became the 11th country to graduate in November 1966.  
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assistance committee (DAC) countries, Japan has maintained her position as a 
leading donor in the world. Of the policy changes during the period under review in 
this study, the first policy change came in the early 1970s, when Japan had to revise 
her foreign policy because of various international crises. The first one is the oil 
embargo by Organization for Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1973 which 
severely affected Japan. The oil crisis stimulated Japan to redesign her foreign policy 
to secure a steady supply of energy and other resources during this period. Aid was 
utilized as an essential instrument to protect diplomatic interests with resource-rich 
countries outside of Asia. In addition, Japan had to balance between the resource-
rich Middle East countries and Israel and her western alliance. The oil crisis also 
resulted in Japan’s globalization of her aid allocation and expansion into new regions 
such as Africa, Latin America, and Middle East. The initial share for the new regions 
accounted for about one third of Japan’s total aid. 
 
Apart from the oil crisis other factors that affected general foreign policy as well as 
aid policy in the 1970s were the relationship with the US, pressure from the 
international community (especially from the US and other DAC countries) to 
increase the aid budget and her image question in the global environment. Japan 
become conscious that she would have to give more weight to the US-Japan 
relationship because of political and security reasons as well as for the expansion of 
her international economic activities. Insecurity on the Korean peninsula, instability in 
China, and the intentions of the Soviet Union in Asia became increasing security 
concerns for the country (Koppel and Orr, 1993: 342). Moreover Japan’s trade with 
the US continued to increase. What the US sought from Japan was her participation 
in a share of the global security objectives of the western alliance. Given this 
situation, Japan began to define her aid programme with broadly defined political 
and security objectives paving the way for aid to enter into the foreign policy 
framework of Japan. 
 
After the mid 1970s, the Association for Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) entered as 
a new element of Japan’s Southeast Asian policy framework equation. Japan’s 
interest in the Southeast Asian region began before World War II and it further 
intensified given the formation of ASEAN in 1967. Japan has long held the philosophy 
that her security and economic prosperity is rooted in, amongst other things, the 
security and stability of Southeast Asia. Because of these reasons Japan began to 
improve her diplomatic relationship with the region as whole and the bilateral level.  
 
The China-Japan peace and friendship treaty was signed in August 1978 (Economic 
Cooperation Bureau, 2001: 167). Japan has always remained important to because 
of their cultural and historical closeness, geographical proximity, and strategic and 
political interests. Strategic considerations include China’s natural resources, 
especially energy; political considerations include building close and friendly relations 
with China to give Japan a counterbalance to still strained tie with the Russia, 
ambiguity over North Korea, and conflicts in Indochina (Rix, 1993: 139). It was not 
until 1979 that Tokyo extended its first ODA to China followed by normalization of 
diplomatic relations in 1972 and signing of the peace treaty in 1978. In 1979, China 
showed a willingness to accept foreign aid for eight infrastructure construction 
projects. Japanese aid to China has increased substantially since then. 
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Given the impacts of a series of international crises in the 1970s, foreign aid did not 
remain a simple tool of economic self-interest but entered into the foreign policy 
framework as a strong diplomatic tool. Lacking military power, Japan’s policy-makers 
started to use aid as a tool to secure her own position, to resolve regional and 
country level conflicts so that disputes or external intervention might never develop, 
and to improve her position in the global environment as a resourceful and 
creditworthy nation. As such, foreign aid began to develop both in quantitative and 
qualitative terms. In 1978, the first medium term ODA Plan (1978-80) was 
introduced, targeting to double the annual amount from $1.4 to $2.8 at the end of 
the period (Table 1). From 1978 to 1980, Japan more than doubled her annual ODA 
disbursements.  ODA to GNP ratio rose from 0.23 of 1978 level to 0.32 in 1980.  
 
Having the experience of difficult aid management in the 1970s, aid later developed 
into a multi-dimensional and multi-purpose diplomatic instrument in the 1980s. 
Despite the lion’s share of aid being biased toward Asia6, Japanese aid eventually 
began to acquire a global focus, enhancing Japan’s relations with rest of the world. 
The Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) wanted to use ODA to 
restructure Japan’s FDI and trade relations with Southeast Asia. The Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MOFA), on the other hand, was more likely to use aid as a diplomatic 
lever. As a result both commercial and strategic perspectives dominated the aid flow 
of Japan in the 1980s. 
 
ODA policy-making was a bit challenging in the latter half of the 1980s. Aid became 
the subject of evaluation in both domestic and international platforms. Western 
alliance tinted out Japanese pledges for more ODA and the failure to meet DAC 
standard in terms of concessionality. Domestic critics from the media, universities, 
grassroots organizations, and opposition parties focused on the waste and corruption 
of Japanese ODA. More challenges for the ODA policy came after the Plaza Accord in 
September 1985. The outcome of the Plaza accord was the recognition of Japan as 
an economic superpower. Firstly, the Plaza accords increased the expectations 
substantially about Japan’s global role as the largest creditor nation. Secondly, it 
forced Japan to respond quickly with her own economic security and competitiveness 
strategies in the changing economic polarization. The Plaza accord can be considered 
as a milestone for Japan because at this point the country regained her confidence 
as a great economic power and began to define her role heading into the twenty first 
century.  
 
Another important event in 1985 was the international debt crises. International debt 
crises gave the lesson of growing interdependence between rich and poor through 
globalizations. Japan’s initial response to the debt crises was a $10 billion multilateral 
aid package in 1986 and a $20 billion surplus recycling plan in 1987. However, 
                                                 
6  Japan’s aid concentration to Asia was almost 100 per cent in the 1960s and very first years of the 
1970s. In 1971, 98.4 per cent of Japanese aid went to Asia. However, the percentage declined 
gradually in the later years of the decade and by the late 1970s the percentage stabilized between 65 
to 70 per cent. In the early 1980s the Foreign Ministry unofficially instituted a policy of maintaining 
70-10-10-10 ratio, which means 70 per cent to Asia and 10 per cent each for Latin America, the 
Middle East and Africa, respectively. 
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following the debt crises Japan developed a problem balancing its interests and 
western pressure to explicitly include concessionality especially economic policy 
reform in ODA allocation, for the latter Japan was not entirely supportive. As Japan 
always places high value on the agreements of her western alliance at least to avoid 
criticism about the quality of aid, policy concessionality was included as an explicit 
agenda of ODA allocation. In June 1988, the fourth medium term ODA Plan (1988-
1992) was announced and in December 1989, Japan emerged as a leading ODA 
donor among members for the first time.  
 
After the Plaza Accord in 1985, coping with increased international economic 
competitiveness became a key issue for Japan. The appreciation of the yen made 
certain manufacturing sectors uncompetitive and allowed the country to move her 
manufacturing overseas. Japan explored to find profitable investment opportunities 
abroad. Asia and especially the Southeast Asia emerged as natural candidates due to 
superior locational advantage for Japan’s FDI. Since 1985 Japan’s FDI in Asian 
manufacturing grew quickly from about $500 million a year to over $3 billion a year 
(Arase, 1995: 142). Japanese ODA began to be used as a way to build infrastructure, 
to improve domestic skills, and to create institutions in her Asian neighbours, 
ensuring less risky flows of Japanese capital.  Undoubtedly, Japan’s effort was 
successful and both of the parties benefited. Japan could face her economic 
challenges and Southeast Asian countries could experience a higher growth path. 
This success story led Japan to formulate her own style of development cooperation: 
support industrial development and economic integration of developing countries 
(Ohno, 2003: 30-41).  
 
In the second half of the 1980s the power of the socialist block was on track to 
weaken with significant implications Japan’s ODA policy. One such implication related 
to Japan’s contribution to western security. During the Cold War era there was 
pressure from the western alliance, especially from the US, to allocate more aid to 
the countries facing a Soviet threat. Anyway, as security threats disappeared, the 
transition economies in Asia became a more feasible region for Japan’s foreign 
assistance and private capital flow because of continued market-oriented reform in 
those economies.  
 
Japanese aid in the 1990s  
 
Transitional economies in Asia such as Laos, Vietnam, and Mongolia emerged as key 
recipient nations as Japan’s overall economic and political interest and ODA flow to 
these countries increased substantially in the 1990s. In addition, after the break-up 
of former Soviet Union in 1991, previously socialist countries in Central Asia and 
Eastern Europe became included on the ODA recipient list for the reconstruction of 
the countries in order to hold Japan’s image and interest in the changing 
environment. Given the changing global socio-economic, political and environmental 
situation together with the collapse of the Cold War, Japan enacted a new ODA 
charter in 1992. As a result, Japan’s ODA has become more streamlined and 
objective-based in the last decade than ever before. The basic philosophy of the ODA 
charter was induced from a humanitarian background of widespread poverty, 
environmental concerns, self-help efforts of the recipient counties and that of Japan’s 
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recognition of interdependence and so as to bring peace and prosperity together. 
The application of the charter, however, as it is specified, should be dealt with case 
to case basic and with consideration of each country’s specific development context 
and a positive reaction if the country shows improvements in areas of assistance. 
Moreover, some flexibility must be expected in case of humanitarian or emergency 
aid or aid given through international organizations or NGOs. The charter was 
adopted from the viewpoint of Japan’s commitment to maintain world peace and 
from the perspective of the changing environment especially with the end of the Cold 
War and its experience of managing ODA for last 38 years. Given the ODA charter in 
1992, its subsequent amendments and effort of the country as a whole, it is 
expected that Japan’s ODA has been more streamlined and objective-based in the 
last decade than ever before. During this period the fifth ODA plan (1993-97) was 
introduced. It was envisage to increase ODA allocation up to $70-$75 billion for the 
five year period. 
 
Japanese aid in 2000-present  
 
At the time of this writing the government of Japan is revising its decade old ODA 
charter in response to the global changes induced by the 11 September 2001 attacks, 
the Millennium Development Goals adopted by the United Nations, and increasing 
calls for Japan to have more transparent and greater diversity in ODA programmes. 
It has been asserted in the discussion above that Japanese bilateral aid allocation 
has two goals. The first goal has been survival and prosperity, reflecting the 
economic aspect of its aid policy. This is what some writers have described as 
‘economic nationalism’ (Hasegawa, 1975: 3; Ozawa, 1989: 95; and Tisch and 
Wallace 1994, 6)7. According to the most recent ODA policy report published by the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, since Japan relies heavily on the use of foreign 
resources and markets, “coexistence with the world, and in particular, with Asia, has 
been an essential requirement for Japan's survival and prosperity” (MOFA, 2002)8. 
Accordingly, most Japanese aid flows into neighbouring Asian countries with which it 
has considerable trade and investment links. Allocation of aid in this way more or 
less reflects recycling of the Japanese surplus created from large external trade and 
investment.  
 
The second goal has been to acquire and maintain the social and political trust of the 
world community. Japan has kept pace with the other developed nations by joining 
the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) in 1961 as a founding member. It has 
also been a member of the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) since 1964. Membership in these organisations places responsibilities on 
member countries to meet targets as jointly determined in regard to development 
assistance but still permits individual member countries to set their own aid levels 
                                                 
 
7   Hasegawa divided objectives of the Japanese aid programme as falling into five groups: (1) 
Japanese nationalism, (2) non-ideological economic expansionism, (3) ideological expansionism, (4) 
self-preservation, and (5) world communalism.  
8  The Final Report of the Second Consultative Committee on ODA Reform of Japanese Government is 
available at http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/oda/reform/report0203.html. Accessed date is 20 December 
2002. 
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(Rix, 1980: 28).  Anyway, Japan has presented the rationale for its foreign assistance 
programme in terms of five main factors: perceived international obligation (1) as a 
rich nation, (2) as the world’s greatest creditor nation, (3) as a country economically 
dependent on less developed countries, (4) as a peace-loving nation and (5) as the 
only advanced non-western nation (Rix, 1993: 14). 
 
Table 1: ODA Plans of Japan and their main features 
Plan Period Main features/targets 
First Plan 1978-1980 To double the annual amount of ODA from $1.4 billion per year 
to $2.8 billion per year at the end of the period. 
Second Plan 1981-1985 To double the 5 year total amount of ODA from $10.7 billion to 
$21.4 billion at the end of the period. 
Third Plan 1986-1992 To double the annual amount of ODA from $3.8 billion per year 
to $7.6 billion per year at the end of the period. 
Fourth Plan 1988-1992 To double the 5 year total amount of ODA from $25 billion per 
year to $50 billion per year at the end of the period. 
Fifth Plan 1993-1997 To increase the 5 year total amount of ODA from $70 billion to 
$75 billion at the end of the period and also increase grant 
components and untied projects. 
Sixth Plan 1999-2004 ODA has been more streamlined and objective based. Has 
encouraged more NGO participation. 
Source: Adapted from Yamashita and Khachi (2003) 
As mentioned earlier, whatever the reasons mentioned above, Japan, as one of the 
largest donor countries in the world, has made ODA contributions to more than 150 
developing countries. Table 2 below reveals the comparative picture of Japanese aid. 
Table 2: Japanese net ODA compared with other donor countries 
  1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000 2001 2002 
225.79 1229.44 5249.84 11175.88 13507.96 9846.82 9282.96 
Japan (0.22) (0.22) (0.30) (0.26) (0.28) (0.23) (0.23) 
115.77 398.63 797.86 1033.64 987.14 872.78 988.74 
Australia (0.43) (0.44) (0.40) (0.30) (0.26) (0.24) (0.25) 
88.44 323.27 557.23 848.15 819.66 867.32 1071.59 
Belgium (0.56) (0.52) (0.51) (0.36) (0.35) (0.37) (0.42) 
120.26 729.82 1639.35 2155.79 1743.60 1532.75 2006.41 
Canada (0.14) (0.46) (0.45) (0.38) (0.25) (0.23) (0.29) 
845.05 1343.05 3852.73 7278.24 4104.71 4198.03 5486.15 
France (0.91) (0.43) (0.55) (0.53) (0.31) 0.32 0.39 
436.28 1541.53 3670.09 6664.17 5030.00 (4989.50) (5324.43) 
Germany - (0.28) (0.38) (0.32) (0.27) (0.27) (0.27) 
90.29 209.61 1704.90 2599.99 1376.26 1626.95 2332.13 
Italy (0.14) (0.11) (0.28) (0.23) (0.13) (0.15) (0.20) 
78.66 626.77 1637.06 2844.45 3134.78 3172.49 3338.01 
Netherlands (0.37) (0.65) (0.92) (0.79) (0.84) (0.83) (0.80) 
453.30 973.89 1925.53 3232.30 4501.26 4578.99 4924.34 United 
Kingdom - (0.38) (0.34) (0.28) (0.31) (0.32) (0.31) 
3463.71 4010.33 8381.40 9596.82 9954.89 11429.35 13290.07 
United States (0.50) (0.25) (0.21) (0.14) (0.10) (0.11) (0.13) 
Source: OECD Statistics Online9 and World Development Indicators. Note: Net ODA figures are in million US dollar. 
Net ODA figure as percentage of GNP is given in parentheses.  
                                                 
9 http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/ 
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Regional distribution of Japanese aid 
 
On the issue of regional distribution, it was in the second diplomacy report, produced 
as far back as 1958, which emphasised the importance of economic prosperity of 
Asia as a necessary condition for the political and economic stability of Japan itself. 
Hence the favoured position held by Asia in the distribution of Japanese assistance. 
This distribution scheme, with priority given to Asia, may remain unchanged for 
several years given the highly diverse conditions in Asian developing countries in 
terms of income levels, growth rates and social and environmental conditions 
(Cooray, 2003). Since the collapse of the former Soviet Union, the transition 
economies in Central Asia were also added to the number of Asian countries 
receiving Japanese assistance. Table 2 below presents details of the geographical 
distribution of Japanese ODA. From the table we can note that Japanese aid to Asia 
is unequally distributed by country and region.  Southeast Asia, whose per capita 
incomes are comparatively higher, receives 32.7 per cent of the total as compared to 
the 11.7 per cent received by the so-called Southwest Asia.  In the geographical 
distribution of Japanese ODA, Africa ranks second as a recipient world region with 
Latin America and the Caribbean occupying the third position. Africa received 10.1 
per cent of Japanese ODA in 2000 and Latin America 8.3 per cent. A detail of the 
geographical distribution of Japanese ODA is shown in Table 3.  
 
Table 3: Regional distribution of Japanese aid 
    1980 1985-89 1990-94 1995-1999 2000 
Asia   1383 3183.2 4913.4 4993.716 5283.82
    (70.51) (64.04) (58.30) (55.95) (54.81) 
  Northeast Asia 82 616.6 1133.2 1099.658 700.46 
    (4.18) (12.41) (13.45) (12.32) (7.2) 
  Southeast Asia 861 1684 2533.2 2444.924 3155.47
    (43.89) (33.88) (30.06) (27.39) (32.73) 
  Southwest Asia 435 875.2 1229.2 1269.942 1130.07
    (22.18) (17.61) (14.59) (14.23) (11.72) 
  Others 5 7.4 17.8 179.192 297.82 
    (0.25) (0.15) (0.21) (2.01) (3.09) 
Middle East   204 403.6 829.8 546.23 727.46 
    (10.40) (8.12) (9.85) (6.12) (7.55) 
Africa   223 622 934.2 1029.526 968.98 
    (11.37) (12.51) (11.09) (11.53) (10.05) 
Central and South America 118 384.4 749.6 842.042 799.56 
    (6.02) (7.73) (8.89) (9.43) (8.29) 
Oceania   12 67.6 131.2 160.446 151.06 
    (0.61) (1.36) (1.56) (1.80) (1.57) 
Europe   -1.5 4 106.8 156.424 117.57 
    (-0.08) (0.08) (1.27) (1.75) (1.22) 
Unallocated/unspecified   23 305.6 763.4 1197.726 1591.64
    (1.17) (6.15) (9.06) (13.42) (16.51) 
Total   1961.5 4970.4 8427.6 8925.91 9640.09
    (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00) (100.00)
Source: Compiled by authors from various ODA Annual Reports.  
Note: Percentage is given in parenthesis. Net disbursement is in million dollars.  
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3. Review of literature on aid allocation 
 
Having discussed the policies of Japanese aid and its regional distribution 
highlighting factors affecting aid allocation, we present in this section a review of 
literature on determinants of aid allocation of other donor countries. Research on 
bilateral aid allocation behaviour started in the mid-1950s. Since then several studies 
have been done on aid allocation decisions of various bilateral donors, mostly on the 
United States and other western donors. However, the use of econometric modelling 
to describe the decision of aid allocation began in the late 1970s. The most 
pioneering and widely cited empirical works include those of McKinlay and Little 
(1977, 1979), McKinlay (1978). They estimated two different equations with different 
variables representing both the recipient-need and donor-interest (RN-DI) aspects in 
aid allocation pattern of major donors. However, in recent years criticisms have 
emerged regarding the specification of the RN-DI model (McGillivray, 2003). 
McKinlay and Little (1977, 1979) analyzed US aid allocation behaviour over the 
period 1960 to 1970. The results revealed that humanitarian criteria did not cause 
and explain US aid allocation, whereas security and political reasons were found to 
be highly significant in the US aid allocation choice. 
 
Maizels and Nissanke (1984), with cross country data, attempted to identify the 
underlying principles of aid allocation using recipient need and donor interest for the 
period 1969/70 to 1978/80. The study examined bilateral and multilateral aid from 
principal donors such as the US, France, Germany, Japan and the UK. Results found 
that bilateral aid flows are heavily determined by donor interest where as multilateral 
aid allocations are made available according to recipient needs. 
 
McGillivray and Oczkowski (1992) found that the UK favours its former colonies 
(currently known as Commonwealth Countries) in their bilateral aid allocation. The 
result was also consistent with humanitarian interests. 
 
Shishido and Minato (1994: 110) studied the ODA behaviour of the G7 countries at 
both aggregate and bilateral levels. According to the study “many differences were 
observed in their behaviour in terms of international security, conflicts between 
policy targets, neutrality, humanitarianism, trade linkage, etc., at both the aggregate 
and bilateral allocation levels in the ODA flow”. The countries, according to the study, 
that show a growing dynamism in their ODA behaviour are Japan, Germany, France, 
and Italy.  
 
Gounder (1994) tested the recipient need and donor interest hypotheses by taking 
Australia’s bilateral aid programs into consideration. In contrast to the findings of 
other studies, both donor interest and recipient need models are supported in the 
case of Australia’s bilateral aid allocation. Again, Gounder and Sen (1999) studied the 
behaviour of Australian aid to Indonesia using the data from 1970/71 to 1995/96. 
Two regression models, namely RN and DI models; were employed. The results 
revealed that both RN and DI models explain Australia’s aid to Indonesia, in general, 
but the RN model dominates the DI model. 
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Arvin and Drewes (2001: 176) focused on the issues of population and middle-
income biases in German aid allocation. The sample study of 85 recipient countries 
for the period 1973-1995 found evidence of population bias but no middle-income 
bias in German aid allocation. Berthelemy and Tichit (2002: 26) studied the aid 
allocation behaviour of the 22 donors of the Development Assistance Committee of 
the OECD for 20 years (1980-99) and 137 recipient countries. The authors utilised a 
Tobit model in their study and found that aid is generally increasing for most donors 
in the 1990s and good economic and political environments have been rewarded by 
donors since 1990. 
 
Neumayer (2003:109) studied the determinants of aid allocation of four regional 
multilateral development banks namely the African Development Bank, the Caribbean 
Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank, the Inter-American Development 
Bank and three United Nations agencies namely United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP), United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), and United Nations 
Regular Programme of Technical Assistance (UNTA). Introducing various policy 
variables in the analysis along with most of the conventional variables like GDP per 
capita, population etc, the study found that most multilateral development banks 
focus on economic need, while out of the three United Nations agencies UNDP’s 
result is robust for the human development variable. Again while the political 
freedom variable, an unweighted sum of political rights and civil liberty indexes, plays 
a role for some agencies, personal integrity rights or corruption does not play a 
significant role for any banks or agencies. The three United Nations agencies have 
bias of more aid to countries geographically more distant from the centres of 
Western World and most donors, with exception of the African Development Bank, 
are affected by a population bias. 
 
McGillivray (2003: 5) pointed out that estimations of two separate equations provides 
biased results as the both recipient needs and donor interests influence aid allocation 
in a different way. As all of the donor-interest and recipient-need variables have an 
effect on aid allocation, it is necessary to introduce them altogether in one equation. 
He also studied the reliability of the RN-DI studies by using rigorous econometric 
methods and found that, as opposed to the previous findings in RN-DN studies, 
development criteria, in fact, affected the US aid allocation assessment during the 
cold war period. Table 4 shows the summary of major studies on aid allocation 
together with their main features. 
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Table: 4 Summary of major studies on bilateral ODA allocation 
Author (date) and 
sample period (SP) 
Donor Explanatory variables Main Findings 
McKinlay and Little 
(1977 and 1979) 
Sample period: 
1960-70 
U.S. Recipient need: GDP per capita, per capita calorie 
consumption, number of doctors per 100,000 
population, size of international liquidity, growth rate of 
real per capita GDP, and gross domestic fixed capital 
formation. 
Donor interest: development interests, overseas 
economic interests, security interests, power political 
interests, and political stability and democracy interest 
variables. 
 
Foreign policy view clearly 
dominated. 
Maizels and 
Nissanke (1984) 
Sample period: 
1969-70 and 1978-
80 
U.S.,  French, 
German, 
Japanese, 
British, 
multilateral aid 
flow 
Recipient need: Population, GNP per capita, PQLI, GNP 
growth rate, balance of payments 
Donor Interest: Political and security interests, 
investment interests, and trade interests variables. 
Donor interest model 
provides good explanation 
for bilateral aid, whereas 
recipient need model fits 
multilateral flow. 
Mark McGillivray 
and Edward 
Oczkowski (1992) 
Sample period: 
1980-87 
Britain GNP per capita, population, dummy variable for least 
developed countries, newly industrialized country 
dummy. 
British bilateral aid 
eligibility and amount 
decisions are related to 
her humanitarian, 
commercial, and political 
interests in developing 
countries. 
1994: Gounder 
Sample period: 
1985-92 
Australia Recipient need: per capita living levels, growth rate of 
per capita, deficit of the balance of payments, 
population 
Both recipient need and 
donor interest models 
provide good explanation 
of Australia’s bilateral aid. 
Shishido, Minato 
(1994) 
Sample period: 
1970-89 
G7 countries: 
Japan, US, 
Canada, UK, 
France, 
Germany, and 
Italy 
Aggregate ODA: nominal GDP, current account balance, 
exchange rate, defence expenditure, social security 
expenditure. 
Bilateral ODA: population, per capita GNP, share of 
primary imports, manufacturing exports. 
Many differences were 
observed in the behaviour 
of donors. Japan, 
Germany, France, and 
Italy show growing 
dynamism in their ODA 
behaviour. 
1999: Gounder 
and Sen 
Australia Recipient need: per capita GNP, deficit on the balance of 
payments, population, time lag of per capita aid 
Donor interest: per capita military aid, Australia’s 
investment to Indonesia, Australia’s export to Indonesia.
 
Recipient need model 
dominates the donor 
interest model. 
Arvin and Drewes 
(2000) 
Sample period: 
1973-95 
German GNP per capita, population, import of the recipient from 
Germany, privileged group, and country dummy 
Existence of a population 
bias, but no evidence of a 
middle income bias. 
 
Berthelemy and  
Tichit (2002) 
Sample period: 
1980-99 
22 donors of 
the DAC of 
OECD 
Real GDP per capita, population, growth rate, FDI, 
primary enrolment rate, infant mortality, total aid 
commitment of other donors, civil liberty and political 
freedom, bilateral trade flow, dummy variables: former 
colony, when the recipient is Egypt and donor is USA. 
Donors reward good 
economic policy outcomes 
since 1990.The end of 
cold war has reduced the 
bias towards former 
colonial links. 
 
Neumayer (2003)  
Sample period: 
1983-97 
Four regional 
development 
banks and 
three United 
Nations 
agencies. 
Population, GDP per capita, political freedom, integrity 
rights, military expenditures, arms imports, PQLI, 
corruption, colony dummy. 
Most regional 
development banks focus 
exclusively on economic 
need of the recipient. UN 
agencies take account the 
human development 
aspects. 
McGillivary (2003) US GNP per capita, population, infant morality rate, income 
growth, US export to recipient country, US arms transfer 
to the recipient, and special relation dummy. 
 
Development criteria have 
had a larger influence 
during the Cold War 
period than previously 
thought. 
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4. The model specification, data and estimation 
 
As evident, in Section 2 on Japanese aid policy and Section 3 on the literature survey 
of aid allocation, donors have underlying factors which affect their aid allocation 
decisions. Existing literature classifies them into donor-interest and recipient-need. 
Recently, policy performance variables have been included in aid allocation studies as 
a third group of variables. Donor-interest explains the economic, political, and 
strategic interests of the donor while recipient-need explains the economic, social, 
and human development needs of the recipient countries. As shown in the literature 
review, there is little doubt that donor interest variables play dominant role in aid 
allocation although donor’s various policy documents explain recipient need criteria 
as a main factor in allocating aid. For example, the basic doctrines of Japan’s ODA 
Charter of 1992 are those of humanitarian considerations and to support recipient in 
self-help efforts. If aid is allocated on the basis of recipient needs, then the poorest 
countries should receive more aid than their richest counterparts. A number of 
studies find that donors give more aid to poor countries. Some studies include 
human development aspects to explain recipient need. Following Burnside and 
Dollar’s (1997) conclusions that aid works only in a good policy environment, bilateral 
and multilateral donors are now becoming concerned with the policy environment of 
recipient countries. Recent aid allocation studies accordingly include some policy 
performance variables. 
 
A turning point of aid allocation is the studies of McKinlay and Little that introduced 
the tools of econometric analysis. McKinlay and Little are concerned about the 
bilateral aid and their various studies are on German aid, French aid, British aid, and 
United States aid using data for each year from 1960 to 1970. The major innovation 
of McKinlay and little is the use of two separate models: recipient need and donor 
interest (see review of literature section for details). However, in recent years critics 
have argued against estimating two separate models (McGillivray, 2003: 4).  
McGillivary shows that estimating two separate equations is problematic; 
econometrically speaking, he asserts that both recipient need and donor interest 
influence aid allocation. In this case both models are mis-specified due to the 
omission of relevant variables. McGillivary’s findings have given rise to a second 
generation of studies in aid allocation: bringing donor interest, recipient need and 
policy performance variables inclusively into one model.  
 
In the current study, we put all Recipient Need (RN), Donor Interest (DI), policy 
performance variables together so this approach can escape the criticism of the 
omitted variable problem. The model is estimated using cross-sectional and time 
series data for recipient countries. All explanatory variables are in one year lag. This 
is due to the fact that aid decisions are made just prior to or at the commencement 
of a year. At that time data available to the decision makers is mostly for previous 
year. We choose aid commitment rather than the disbursement as the dependent 
variable. Here, commitment should be viewed as the decision to supply aid. If the 
receipts are lower than the commitment it is due to the subsequent failure of the 
recipients. There is controversy in existing literatures about the use of endogenous 
variable in per capita or absolute terms (McGillivary, 1992: 1314). Calculating per 
capita aid allocations, from a pool of predetermined funds, may be a difficult and 
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cumbersome procedure as donors and aid agencies rarely report aid in per capita 
terms. The fact is that aid is allocated in absolute terms from a large amount of 
pooled funds. Absolute aid allocation is the final decision which may be already 
adjusted for the population of the recipient country, if donors deem it important. The 
variables ODA, population, per capita GDP, distance, export from Japan and import 
to Japan are employed in natural log as they vary across a large range among 
recipients. Population and GDP per capita are also employed in the quadratic form to 
allow for non-linearity in their relationship with the aid variable. The general form of 
the regression equation is as follows: 
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Where, ODA is the bilateral ODA commitment, GDP is real GDP per capita of the 
recipient country, POP is Population of the recipient country, EXP_J is export from 
Japan to recipient country; and IMP_J is the import to Japan from recipient country. 
Freedom is an index of democracy indicating civil liberty and political right of the 
recipient country. DIST is the distance from Tokyo to the capital city of the recipient 
country IMR is the infant mortality rate while OPEN is the openness index of the 
recipient country. 
 
 
Data and sources 
 
The sample included in this study covers about 96 Japanese aid recipient 
countries/territories for the period of 1981-2001. Every attempt has been made to 
contain as many recipient countries as possible. Sample size is affected by the 
availability of data of the explanatory variables. Data for all variables are taken on a 
yearly basis. ODA is the bilateral ODA commitments by purpose of the Japanese 
Government taken from the Geographical Distribution of Financial Flow of Source 
OECD online database. The nominal ODA flow has been converted to real using 1995 
constant dollars by using the deflator for resource flow from DAC members. Real 
GDP per capita at constant 1995 dollars is taken from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) online database. POP is the Population of the recipient country, also 
collected from WDI. EXP_J and IMP_J are the constant 1995 exports and imports 
from and to Japan respectively collected from Source OECD. Nominal export and 
import data are collected from Direction of Trade (DOT) online database and again it 
is converted into real figures by using the deflator. The distance (DIST) from Tokyo 
to the capital city of the recipient country is collected from Meridian world database. 
Index for freedom of democracy is an un-weighted sum of political right and civil 
liberty indexes taken from Freedom House’s Freedom of the World survey. The 
survey evaluates political rights and civil liberties separately on a seven-category 
scale, 1 representing the most free and 7 the least free. Infant mortality rate is 
included in this study as an indicator of the performance of social policies in the 
recipient country. The data is collected from the WDI online of the World Bank. 
However because of the large number of missing observations in the data series it 
has been necessary to estimate missing values from the data set. When we don’t 
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have any a priori information, the most common approach is to replace the missing 
observation with the sample mean of observations OPEN is the ratio of the sum of 
the export and import to GDP of the recipient country. Export, import and GDP data 
are collected from the WDI online of the World Bank.  
 
5. Estimated results and conclusion 
 
The estimation results are given in the following table 5. Because the absolute 
amount of aid varies in large extend among the recipient, it is suspected that 
heteroscedasticity presents in the data. For this reason, a Generalized Least Squares 
(GLS) in Cross Section Weights is employed.  For each specification “F” test is 
performed to compare the common intercept and fixed effects estimation. The test 
statistics rejects the null hypothesis of common intercept. In the second stage, 
random effects model is run and Hausman test statistics is performed for each of the 
specifications to compare fixed effects and random effects. The Hausman test 
statistics reject the random effects in favour of the fixed effects models. However, as 
the distance variable can not be estimated in the fixed effects model because of its 
time-invariant characteristics, the GLS estimation in common intercept is also 
reported in table 5 along with the fixed effects specifications. The explanatory 
powers of equations as measured by R2 are quite high given the cross sectional 
nature of the study. The variables such as real GDP per capita, population size, 
exports from Japan to recipient country, imports to Japan from the recipient 
countries, distance, and the infant mortality rate variable are entered in all equations 
because of better data availability. The variable OPEN is included to check the 
number of observations and robustness of the results. As for the DIST variables the 
sign of the coefficients are negative as expected and statistically significant at 1% in 
the common intercept estimations. This illustrates Japan’s bias toward Asian 
countries. It should be noted that Asia concentration is the outcome of overall 
foreign policy objectives. 
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Table 5: Estimated equations 
 Common Intercept Fixed Effects 
 Specification 1 Specification 2 Specification 
1 
Specification 
2 
GDPPC 3.228*** 
(10.844) 
2.767*** 
(7.287) 
3.205*** 
(3.605) 
2.788** 
(2.526) 
GDPPC2 -0.247*** 
(-12.122) 
-0.219*** 
(-8.081) 
-0.173** 
(-2.543) 
-0.156* 
(-1.856) 
POP 0.617*** 
(15.675) 
0.583*** 
(10.548) 
2.606*** 
(8.574) 
3.192*** 
(6.776) 
POP2 -0.026*** 
(-4.325) 
-0.029*** 
(-4.117) 
-0.267*** 
(-4.591) 
-0.357*** 
(-4.153) 
EXP_J 0.064* 
(1.681) 
0.123*** 
(2.692) 
0.186*** 
(3.602) 
0.187*** 
(2.896) 
IMP_J 0.078*** 
(3.757) 
0.098*** 
(4.1) 
0.059* 
(1.877) 
0.0007 
(0.018) 
DIST  -1.133*** 
(-12.391) 
-0.988*** 
(-8.016) 
  
Freedom -0.114*** 
(-10.766) 
-0.099*** 
(-7.866) 
-0.057*** 
(-4.126) 
-0.026* 
(-1.681) 
IMR 0.0001 
(1.09) 
-0.0007 
(0.457) 
-0.002 
(-0.482) 
-0.004 
(1.039) 
OPEN  0.134 
(1.007) 
 -0.009 
(-0.045) 
Constant  2.108 
(1.583) 
2.25 
(1.217) 
  
No. of obs. 1644 1402 1644 1402 
Adjusted R2 0.782 0.781 0.886 0.883 
Dependent variable is total bilateral aid commitment. GLS regression is with yearly data. Figures are 
rounded.  
*** Significant at 1% level. 
** Significant at 5% level. 
* Significant at 10% level. 
Numbers in the parentheses are t statistics. 
 
In table 5, the common intercept estimations are qualitatively similar to the fixed 
effects estimations. The absolute aid increases as the GDP per capita increases but 
decreases after a threshold level of GDP per capita is reached. Japan’s ODA thus 
shows an income bias (or middle income concerns). Japan may extend aid before 
reaching a threshold level. The relationship between GDPPC and ODA is high in the 
equations. As evident from specification 1 in the fixed effects, after the threshold 
level 1 per cent increase in GDP per capita would decrease absolute ODA by 0.17 per 
cent that reflects humanitarian consideration of Japan’s ODA allocation.  
 
The population variable also shows a non-linear relation. The sign condition is 
positive before a threshold level. Population size represents the recipient need as 
larger the population size the larger the need of total aid. Regression results show 
that at the first stage as population increases absolute aid increases but after a 
threshold level of population the relationship is inverse. Before the threshold level a 
one percent increases of population increases absolute ODA by 2.6 percent but after 
the threshold level one percent increases in population decreases aid by 0.27 percent.  
 
The variable EXP_J and IMP_J explain Japan’s commercial and security objectives. 
The explanation of the export variable should be quite clear as Japan uses ODA to 
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extend the market for her products in the developing world. However, the import 
variable explains the security motive, as discussed earlier, the oil crisis in the early 
1970s stimulated Japan to reshape her foreign policy to secure energy and raw 
material supplies for the domestic economy. In specification 1 of the fixed effects, 
both export and import variables have the expected sign and they are significant. 
The export variable is significant at 1 per cent level and   the import variable is at 10 
percent. These empirical results demonstrate Japan’s commercial and security 
motives in allocating aid. 
 
The parameter for freedom variable is negative as expected and it is significant. This 
means that Japan concerns about the democratic situation of the recipient country 
when they make aid allocation decisions. The variables infant mortality rate and 
openness index are not significant in any specification.  
 
In conclusion, it is clear that Japanese aid allocation policies have changed over time 
and we have identified through our empirical investigation the major determinants of 
Japanese bilateral aid allocation. It is also obvious from the study that Japan takes 
her own national interests as well as recipient countries’ needs into account in 
allocating their aid. The nature of Asian biasness also may continue given Japan’s 
considerable trade and investment links with other Asian countries. Allocation of aid 
in this way more or less reflects recycling of the Japanese surplus created from large 
external trade and investment. Given the historical trends, one can conclude that 
these determinant factors should continue to play a vital role in aid allocation 
decision-making for some years come. 
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